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1. Introduction
Fourteen years after the Dayton Accords were signed, a “negative peace” hangs over BiH
and the entire ex-Yugoslavian Balkan region. The peace-keeping mission of the United Nations has
been able to im plem ent central military aspects of the peace accords with the presence of the
“Stabilization Force” (SFOR) and the command of NATO, such as re-establishing public security
and creating a military balance between the conflicting parties, and to prevent open conflict from
breaking out again. Yet a military stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter B&H) without
SFOR troops has not been able to be guaranteed up to this point. Keeping the current status quo
with the presence of troops, political control and financial support means it will be a long time
before life in B&H has a modicum of normality.1 – the ethnic tensions are too high and the Bosnian
state is not consolidated enough.2 W hile military aspects of the Dayton Accords have been
successfully implemented, there are large deficits in the implementation of civil aspects in the
Accords. These deficits arise from the inefficiency and corruption of political structures, insufficient
development of the rule of law and the economy.3 The people are still suffering from the
destructive effects of war: economic depression, unemployment, discrimination, and fear and
distrust color everyday life. M any vote for the old political cadre from fear of discrimination and
betrayal, but they try to prevent integration in B&H with nationalist interest and blockade policies,
preventing reform and demands for autonomy. The ethnic principle of equal public office
distribution embodied in the Dayton Accords lends legitimacy to the ethno-nationalisms created
before and during the war, and still guides the social discourse 14 years after the war ended.4 A
self-critical examination of the crimes from the recent past with the issue of culpability, penance,
atonement and forgiveness is taking place in the wider public of the Bosnian society. How do
religions, with their strong sense regarding guilt and forgiveness, suggest initiating a reconciliation
process? In this context it is clear from the start that the installation of a truth and reconciliation
commission based on the South African model would fail if it had to be supported by the
traditional religious communities in B&H; just as the attempt by the president of the Jewish
community in B&H failed due to divergent understandings of justice 5.
Let us start with the postulate from John Paul Lederach that reconciliation is based on the
recognition of truth, justice and peaceful coexistence.6 In this paper empirical data from case studies
in traditional religious communities from central Bosnia will be used in order to show the
1
2
3
4
5
6

Reiter 2005, 71.
See Džihiæ 2005, 18ff.; Wnendt 1995, 79ff.
See FAZ 13.8.2002, p. 10.
See Džihiæ 2005, 19.
Interview Finci 2004, 23.
See Lederach 2002, 24ff.
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differences and objects of conflict under the aspect of these three guiding themes that block the path
towards a process of reconciliation for the whole of society initiated by the religions.
2. The Interpretation of the Terms “Truth,” “Justice,” and “Coexistence” from Representatives
of Traditional Religious Communities in B&H
2.1 The Interpretations of the Islamic Religious Community
2.1.1
The Interpretation of the Term “Truth”
The representatives of the M uslim religious community in B&H related the term “truth”
to the question of culpability for the war and thus to the victim/perpetrator designation. For the
M uslim community there is no question that Serbia specifically planned the genocide of Bosnian
M uslims for the creation of a Greater Serbia; to this end the Serbians began a war of aggression in
1993, in the terms of international law, against the autonomous Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
in order to share the territory with Croatia.7 The M uslim population of B&H is, according to the
representative of the Islamic community interviewed, the victim of a genocide, comparable to the
scope of the Shoah and the decimation of the European Jewry. 8
Ah, and as we have in the Second W orld W ar the notion of Holocaust, ah, in this
war, in B&H, you have this new phenomenon, which was not for the first time, but
in B&H it became an issue which is ethnic cleansing. Bosnia or Ex-Yugoslavia
became a symbol or an example, a bad example for ethnic cleansing, and those
who were subject of ethnic cleansing were Bosnian M uslims, that is I would say,
the general truth. 9
The M uslim religious community considers itself primarily as the victim. The war crimes of their
own military are euphemized, or reduced to isolated cases.10
. . . can swear that no one in the Islamic community had the thought of adopting
anything like a ethnic cleansing policy or anything like that, that doesn’t mean that
M uslim soldiers never committed any kind of atrocities, or that we didn’t make
mistake, that we didn’t allow building of mosques on a Serbian property or
destroyed something, you know. Some people still allow it and so on. But I think
that there is quite enough reason to believe that those have been really accidents
like in traffic, where there are rules, where you know how to behave and so on,
and still accidents will happen, but it was never a policy.11
The Bosnian army, or the militias fighting on their side, neither committed systematic war
crimes, nor did they destroy sacred sites to any significant extent, according to many imams and
Islamic scholars. W ith this self-image as the background, and the historical role of the Bosnian
M uslims in the Bosnian W ar, the term “truth” is understood among the M uslim civil society as
factual knowledge, as detailed knowledge about the identity of victim and perpetrator and the
quantitative scope of ethnic cleansing, without recourse to religious explanatory connections 12. As

7
See Interview Ceriæ 2003, 249; Interview 5 2004, 257f.; Interview 33 2004, 282f.; Interview 34 2004, 289; Interview
30 2004, 228; Interview 31 2004, 254; Interview 32 2004, 275.
8
See Interview Ceric 2004, 240; Interview 5 2004, 254; Interview 8 2004, 308; Interview 29 2004, 213; Interview
30 2004, 238; Interview 35 2004, 317.
9
Interview Ceriæ 2004, 240; See Interview 34 2004, 297f.
10
See Interview 5 2004, 261; Interview 32 2004, 275; Interview 29 2004, 253; Interview 30 2004, 228; Interview 8
2004, 308.
11
Interview 29 2004, 211.
12
See Interview 29 2004, 253f.; Interview 36 2004, 327; Interview 29 2004, 215; Interview 35 2004, 317; Interview
5 2004, 257; Interview 21 2004, 222; Interview 6 2004, 254.
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will be addressed in the following section, the individualization of the crimes, and thus the denial
of collective recrimination, is the main interest of the Islamic community.
2.1.2 The Interpretation of the Term “Justice”
The majority of representatives from the M uslim religious community in BiH interpret the
term “justice” in the political sense, as the punishment of individual perpetrators for the crimes
they committed against civilians during the Bosnian W ar from 1992 to 1995.
They should answer for these crimes in court.13 Especially the arrest of those politicians and
military leaders from the Bosnian Serbs who were mainly responsible for the ethnic cleansing were
named specifically: Radovan Karadžiæ and Ratko Mladiæ. A group of interviewees considered the
punishment of war criminals the condition for society to reconcile and coexist:14
You see, it has been repeated in statements of several M uslim representatives here
that reconciliation should be based on justice, justice at first should be based on
punishment of those responsible for genocide. And the M uslim community did
not ask for recomission, it just asked for the arrest of war criminals and sending
them to Den Hague, for trial in Den Hague, so Islamic community has accepted
the juridication of the international court for war crimes in Den Hague.” 15
The majority of clergymen interviewed stressed the importance of the individualization
of the crimes comm itted and the respective punishments. For many clergy this punishment of
individual war criminals represents a condition for social reconciliation because is might then be
possible to release, or at least weaken, collective recrim inations by naming and punishing
individuals. The large majority of the M uslim clergy recognize the prosecution and punishment
of war criminals by the international criminal court in Den Haag and thus the observance of
international law, even if some representatives are critical of how the ICTY [International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia] works, such as the dominance of the international community
or the speed with which it works. 16
The international criminal court is accepted as the highest judicial authority by a large
group of interviewees, who are also the official representatives of the M uslim community. Reis-ulUlema, Dr. Mustafa Ceriæ and his representative Ismet Spahiæ accept the court with the argument
that absolute justice will not be achieved on earth.17
The members of the Islamic community associate justice only secondarily with the legal
principle of equal rights. All citizens in BiH should have the same rights and duties in all areas of
the country, especially for questions of returning war refugees, religious education in schools and
employment.18 Only a small group mentions the political order of BiH and associates the issue of
justice as equality with the demand of dismantling entities and creating autonomous regions 19,
since the Republika Srpska is a result of genocide against M uslims20 and blocks the efforts at reform
that are necessary to fulfill the criteria for EU candidacy. The perspective of EU membership offers

13
See Interview 36 2004, 326; Interview 33 2004, 280; Interview 6 2004, 269; Interview 34 2004, 298; Interview 32
2004, 273f.; Interview Ceriæ 2004, 241; Interview 8 2004, 310f.; Interview 30 2004, 238.
14
See Interview 6 2004, 269; Interview Ceriæ 2004, 240; Interview 30 2004, 329.
15
See Interview 33 2004, 280.
16
See Interview 30 2004, 328; Interview Ceriæ 2004, 240f.
17
See Interview Ceriæ 2004, 242; Interview 30 2004, 328; Interview 6 2004, 268, 270; Interview 32 2004, 273;
Interview 8 2004, 312.
18
Interview 33 2004, 280; Interview 6 2004, 267; Interview 34 2004, 297.
19
See Interview 33 2004, 28; Interview 5 2004, 257; Interview 8 2004, 305.
20
See Interview 5 2004, 257.
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the majority of the M uslim community the most meaningful source of hope for a solution to the
political and economic problems in B&H.21
2.1.3

Interpretation of the Term “Coexistence”
The majority of M uslim religious representatives in B&H understand the term coexistence
as good neighborliness: 22
W e have a concept of neighborhood here which is very important and a
concept of neighborhood was never conceptualized by religion. We have different
identities, for example M uslims. W e have duties towards other M uslims but we
also have duties towards our neighbors, regardless of their religious affiliation and
I think neighborhoods should play and should continue to play the same role. The
fact that you live with someone in the same street means that you have obligations
towards this person to live together, this is also our heritage and this heritage
should be kept and further developed.23
In the opinion of those interviewed, this concept of good neighborliness is based on the
condition that the various nations of B&H live together in one territory that is not organized on the
basis of ethnic homogeneity, and that the state structures do not hinder coexistence between
nations.24 This understanding of coexistence implies the hope that the separation of B&H into two
entities, and thus the attem pt to divide Bosnia into a purely Serbian (Republika Srbska) and a
Croatian (Herceg Bosna) or Muslim area, is doomed to failure, and so the boundaries between the
entities agreed to by the warring parties in the Dayton Accords can be removed. 25 W ith the
background of the Socialist past and the marginalization of religion experienced under Tito’s rule,
the interviewees stressed the necessity of freedom of religion.26 The right to religious freedom, and
thus the free choice of religious m em bership, is connected to the necessity of a basic tolerance
towards the religious “Other”.
This basic tolerance towards others in the sense of tolerating living alongside one another
is not the ideal of coexistence, rather only the basis upon which good neighborly relations can take
place. The concept advanced by the majority of Islamic clergy for good neighborliness is similar
in many ways to concepts of conviviality27 : the most important necessity is respect and honor for
the other28 . M any clergy also valued freedom from prejudice29 and the attempt to know one another
as well as to understand one’s own familiar world as foreign for someone else as part of the basis
for coexistence30 . For many, the ignorance about one’s own religion and the religion of others is a
source of intolerance31 . Approximately half of the interviewees consider the pre-war practice of
21

See Interview 32 2004, 276 Interview 31 2004, 253 Interview 5 2004, 261; Interview 6 2004, 265f.
See Interview 36 2004, 325; Interview 33 2004, 283; Interview 6 2004, 270; Interview 8 2004, 309; Interview 29
2004, 218; Interview 30 2004, 234; Interview 32 2004, 272; Interview 5 2005, 258f.
23
Interview 33 2004, 285.
24
See Interview 31 2004, 253; Interview 33 2004, 281; Interview 32 2004, 243; Interview 30 2004, 229; Interview
34 2004, 287f., Interview 8 2004, 305; Interview 6 2004, 266.
25
See Interview 34 2004, 287f.; Interview Ceriæ 2004, 243; Interview 33 2004, 281; Interview 5 2004, 260.
26
See Interview 36 2004, 325; Interview 29 2004, 215; Interview 34 2004, 293; Interview 5 2004, 259; Interview 35
2004, 319; Interview 30 2004, 234; Interview Ceriæ 2004, 243.
27
See Sundermeier 1996, 137f.
28
See Interview 6 2004, 265f., 266; Interview 32 2004, 273; Interview 8 2004, 305; Interview 31 2004, 253; Interview
5 2004, 259; Interview 35 2004, 320; Interview 36 2004, 324.
29
See Interview 36 2004, 326; Interview 6 2004, 268; Interview 29 2004, 221; Interview 30 2004, 231.
30
See Interview 8 2004, 306; Interview 5 2004, 259; Interview 32 2004, 276; Interview 33 2004, 282; Interview 34
2004, 287f.; Interview 29 2004, 221.
31
See Interview 8 2004, 305; Interview 5 2004, 259.
22
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exchanging visits within the framework of religious holidays an important building block of
coexistence32 . The concept of neighborliness is not based solely on the pre-war practice of mutual
visits for religious holidays, but also on the principle of mutual help33 . Several representatives of
the M uslim community extend this understanding of good neighborliness as a community of help
to a community of protection 34:
This understanding of neighborliness as a community of help and protection reflects the
fear that the failure to coexist would mean a repetition of war experiences, and that the future of
the Bosnian people hangs on the question of a successful coexistence in B&H.35
For us, we consider the dialogue, tolerance and coexistence as our destiny,
our destiny, it is ours to be or not to be. I mean, we don’t have a reserve, a second
country to go, a second homeland to go, no.36
As regards inter-religious relationships, the majority of interviewees affirmed that the
relationship of the M uslim religious community with the Catholic Church is better than the
relationship with the Serbian Orthodox Church.37 Particularly at higher institutional levels the
relationship between the two ethnic or religious groups than it is at the grassroots level. Meetings
such as large religious celebrations only had an official or symbolic character, for example, and did
not arise from a serious motivation to improve relations with the Islamic com m unity.38 Half of
those interviewed blame the Serbian Orthodox Church for being the vehicle of Serbian nationalism
and the idea of a Greater Serbia, and for not having distanced itself from the Serbian nationalists
or war criminals in their ranks:39 As the quoted literature on inter-religious relations in B&H
documents, the clergy interviewed, including the official representative of Bosnian Islam, demand
that the Serbian Orthodox Church ask forgiveness in an official statement for its incorrect conduct
regarding distancing itself from nationalism and war crimes. Several clergy consider this request
for forgiveness as an additional condition for reconciliation:40
Reconciliation [… ] assumes many things like truth and justice and also forgiveness
if you like and also repentance – so all the four needs entirely. You say: ‘I have
done wrong, please forgive me!’ And then I would say: ‘A lright!’ But I will not
forgive, ah, you can’t expect from me when you have done something wrong, that
I will run after you to tell you: ‘I forgive you’ That is not possible. [… ] You know
the people for the people in the Balkans you know they are sometimes very
stubborn to accept things. So we do have a certain resistance especially in the
Serbian political and religious establishments to come out and to say: ‘We did
make a mistake in Srebrenica, this is a mistake. They didn’t say that, we didn’t
hear that clearly. [… ] But especially from the Orthodox church we didn’t hear that
clearly: ‘This was wrong and a sin and we ask for forgiveness really and this will
not happen again, and we ask for forgiveness.’ Then the process of forgiveness and
reconciliation will come out, so this is the process. [… ] I think they have a
32

See Interview 6 2004, 268; Interview 29 2004, 218; Interview 8 2004, 305.
Interview 36 2004, 327.
34
Interview 8 2004, 307.
35
See Interview Ceriæ 2004, 244; Interview Ceriæ 2003, 249; Interview 5 2004, 262.
36
See Interview 29 2004, 211; Interview Ceriæ 2004, 244f.; Interview Ceriæ 2003, 244f.
37
See Interview 36 2004, 323; Interview 5 2004, 258; Interview 33 2004, 283; Interview 29 2004, 210; Interview
Ceriæ 2004, 240; Interview 7 2004, 294; Interview 8 2004, 308.
38
See Interview 36 2004, 330; Interview 31 2004, 254f..
39
See Interview 29 2004, 210; Interview 6 2004, 269; Interview 33 2004, 280; Interview Ceriæ 2004, 245; Interview
30 2004, 227.
40
See Interview 32 2004, 275; Interview 8 2004, 313; Interview 36 2004, 326; Interview Ceriæ 2004, 245.
33
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difficulty to face the truth. That will need some time.41
2.2 The Interpretations of the Jewish Community
2.2.1
The Interpretation of the Term “Truth”
The majority of representatives, employees and presidents of the individual Jewish
communities in B&H define the term truth generally as the absence of lies and hypocrisy, distrust
and manipulation.42 Truth is connected to the virtue of honesty, which creates trust.
This interpretation of the term “truth” is arguably supported by a critique of the ruling
political and religious elite. M any interviewees feel that the religious elite of the country are too
involved in politics and that there is no clear separation of religion and politics in B&H.43
W ith the general criticism of religion interfering in politics, many representatives of the
Jewish community criticize the attempted and actual influence on the state’s affairs of the M uslim
religious comm unity, especially on the part of their leader Reis Ceriæ. And they criticize the
discrimination against the Jewish community consisting of hardly 1000 members, which does not
act with a large lobby.
In connection to the Bosnian W ar, the majority of those interviewed interpret truth as
factual knowledge, including the necessary determination of war criminal’s identities.44 The
representatives of the Jewish community take a neutral position towards the then parties to war,
by stressing that every side has their own truth about what happened in the war.45 For the majority
of the interviewees it was an aggressive war undertaken by the Serbian military, which was joined
by Croatia as it progressed. These representatives of the Jewish community opt for the recognition
of a common truth in order to avoid nationalistic power politics:
I think that this fact is most connected with the truth because if I say that Serbs
killed I don’t know how many M uslims, that this is the truth and that you are
repeating that the whole time, it doesn’t help to forgive and it will keep that hate,
instead of trying to calm it down, all the time. It depends on how you say it, but
you can help people to forgive the past.46
The recognition of a single historical truth regarding the cause of war and the way the war
developed is a basic precondition for interethnic and interreligious reconciliation, according to
most of the interviewees, and this could deprive nationalistic propaganda of a central source of
tension.
2.2.2. The Interpretation of the Term “Justice”
About half of those interviewed connect the term justice almost exclusively with the
punishment of individual war criminals from the rank of all factions.47 The punishment of war
criminals is necessary in order to prevent collective recriminations:
To punish especially war criminals because they have to pay for what they did, if

41
42
43

See Interview Ceriæ 2004, 245.
See Interview 15 2004, 32; Interview 16 2004, 43; Interview 1 2004, 59.
See Interview 17 2004, 51; Interview 1 2004, 59; Interview 14 2004, 13; Interview 2 2004, 68; Interview 15 2004,

31.
44

See Interview 14 2004, 15; Interview 16 2004, 43; Interview Finci 2004, 22; Interview 17 2004, 49; Interview 15

2004, 30.
45

See Interview Finci 2004, 21; Interview 15 2004, 25, 32; Interview 16 2004, 43; Interview 2 2004, 69.
Interview 17 2004, 52.
47
See Interview 17 2004, 49; Interview 14 2004, 13; Interview Finci 2004, 21; Interview 16 2004, 40f.; Interview
2 2004, 67; Interview 15 2004, 27f..
46
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you are Karadžiæ or M ladiæ, if you are in Srebrenica and are still walking free.
They have to pay for what they did, because if they don’t pay then the whole Serb
nationality will be guilty but there is no such thing as a collective guilt, there is no
such thing, it is a personal thing and it is really important that they pay. [… ] If not,
then the people here will not have a positive opinion about Serbs in general and
this is not a good thing because not all Serbs are guilty. So, you have to identify
and you have to bring to the court the people who are guilty. You know, not only
Serbs, they did worse things here, but they are not the only one and you can not
generalize. 48
The demand to identify, deliver, and charge war criminals is just as impartial in the Jewish
community as the demand to collect factual knowledge about the war crimes committed. The
representatives of the Jewish religious community emphasize in this context that war crimes were
committed by all sides49 and that it is the task of every party to war to take care of their own,50
meaning the naming and delivery of their own guilty parties. This interpretation demonstrates the
interest for the Jewish community of making its neutrality in this conflict clear.51
Several interviewees also point to the fact that the creation of peaceful interreligious or
inter-ethnic relationships is not enough to achieve justice in the form of punishing war criminals,
but that the readiness to forgive and reconcile must be present52:
W ith reconciliation, we can reconcile those who understand the guilt, who
accept the guilt, who are ready to admit the guilt, and who can say, I am sorry for
what I did, at the same time we cannot take this excuse in the name of som eone
else. 53
Justice as willingness to reconcile and thus as willingness to forgive and ask forgiveness
is considered a basic precondition for a permanent peaceful coexistence from all three warring
parties.
For the majority of the representatives interviewed, truth as information about crimes
com m itted, justice in the form of individual punishment as well as penance and forgiveness all
belong to a collective reconciliation process, which is the basic condition for a peaceful society.
This understanding of justice is explained by three interviewees with the Jewish
understanding of justice as the practice of reconciliation to create societal peace; more specifically
with the important religious celebration of Yom Kippur, the day of reconciliation. 54
In the Jewish faith, you know, we have Yom Kippur, and we pray for
forgiveness when we did something to somebody, we have to ask them to forgive
so, it is really necessary to forgive if you want to go ahead, not to forget, but to
forgive otherwise I do not know how Jews could live with all that happened in the
Holocaust, so it is really necessary to forgive because you don’t have peace if you
are angry with someone, if you are angry with somebody or if you hate somebody,
then you don’t have peace in yourself and the other as well. And you need some

48

Interview 17 2004, 50.
See Interview Finci 2004, 21; Interview 15 2004, 29f.
50
See Interview 2 2004, 69; Interview 15 2004, 28f.
51
See Interview 15 2004, 25, 33; Interview 16 2004, 42; Interview 17 2004, 46; Interview 1 2004, 54; Interview Finci

49

2004, 23f.
52
53
54

See Interview 14 2004, 12; Interview 17 2004, 50; Interview 15 2004, 30; Interview 16 2004, 41.
Interview Finci 2004, 24.
SeeInterview Finci 2004, 22f.; Interview 1 2004, 58; Interview 17 2004, 50; Interview 14 2004, 13.
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time for it, then it is much easier to forgive than when everything is so fresh.55
Besides the understanding of justice as individual punishment within the fram ework of
a societal reconciliation process, the majority of the Jewish representatives associated justice with
the equality of all ethnic and religious groups in B&H 56 and pointed to the fact that societal peace
and coexistence is only possible on the basis of a fair political system – which will be shown in the
interpretation of the term “coexistence.” The understanding of justice as equal rights implies a
demand for the same rights and chances for each ethnic or religious minority in each region once
dominated by a majority (Herzegovina, Central Bosnia, Republika Srpska). Particularly in the area
of economy,57 the restitution of property that was taken from religious communities, 58 and in
questions of religious freedom or religious instruction in public schools59 the Jewish representatives
do not consider this equality to exist. In contrast to the traditional religious communities in B&H,
they did not formulate this demand for equal rights only in relation to the members of the Jewish
community, but in relation to the minorities living in each of the majority regions.
2.2.3 The Interpretation of the Term “Coexistence”
The interviewees understand coexistence as equality – analogous to their definition of
justice – in coexistence with mutual respect and based on the state guarantee of religious freedom.60
For the Jewish community celebrating the respective holidays together, as was done before the war,
is vital practice of coexistence. 61
One reason for this, which only a few of those interviewed associated with the term
coexistence, may be that the Jewish community has considered mixed marriages, the most extreme
form of coexistence, to be desirable, and this both before and after the war.62 The majority of
interviewees also stressed that coexistence in Bosnien-Herzegovina will only be possible if all
inhabitants consider themselves Bosnians and the question of national and religious identity fades
into the background.63 The representatives of the Jewish community not only reject the existing
Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian nationalisms, but also the recognition of these nationals as
constitutive peoples of BiH as well as the recognition from constitutional regulations and
institutions such as governmental positions that must be equally distributed,64 or the existence of
the entities.65 The quality of interreligious relationships at the high clergy level is evaluated by the
Jewish representatives in the majority as negative, whereby the interreligious relationships at the
grassroots level is considered positive. In general we can conclude from the interviews analyzed
here, that the interethnic and inter-religious relationships between the Jewish community and the
Bosnian elites in religion and politics are significantly worse than those with the Serbian and
Croatian elites.

55
56

Interview 17 2004, 51.
See Interview 1 2004, 55,57; Interview 13 2004, 8; Interview 15 2004, 31; Interview 2 2004, 61, 68; Interview 17

2004, 50.
57

See Interview 1 2004, 56ff.; Interview 2 2004, 68.
See Interview 1 2004, 56, 57; Interview 2 2004, 63; Interview 13 2004, 5.
59
See Interview 1 2004, 57; Interview 2 2004, 61, 67; Interview Prof. Dr. Francine Friedman, Sarajevo 26.6.2004.
60
See Interview 17 2004, 47; Interview 1 2004, 55; Interview 14 2004, 12; Interview Finci 2004, 17f., 20, 16 2004:
37; Interview 15 2004, 29.
61
See Interview 17 2004, 48; Interview 15 2004, 11; Interview 16 2004, 39; Interview 2 2004, 66.
62
See Interview 15 2004: 28; Interview 2 2004: 66; Interview 16 2004: 39; Interview 1 2004: 54; Interview 14 2004,
11; Interview Finci 2004, 20.
63
See Interview 15 2004, 29; Interview 2 2004, 62; Interview 13 2004, 4, Interview 17 2004, 46.
64
See Interview 2 2004, 67.
65
See Interview 16 2004, 41; Interview 15 2004, 26; Interview 17 2004,53.
58
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2.3 The Interpretations of the Catholic Religious Community in B&H
2.3.1
The Interpretation of the Term “Truth”
M ost of the representatives from the Catholic Church in B&H interpret the term truth in
consideration of culpability for the war. For them it is clear that the Bosnian war was not a religious
war,66 rather it was an aggression from Serbia.67 “The war brought Serbia, together with the Bosnian
Serbs, to Bosnia and the pure aggression was rewarded with 49% of Bosnia. [...] He who attacks is
culpable.” 68
One interviewee from the Catholic Church puts this quote into perspective by stressing that
the question of culpability for the war will be evaluated differently by every faction involved and
that there can be no objectivity. The representatives of the Catholic clergy do not explain their
interpretation of the term truth as Serbian’s clear culpability for the war.
2.3.2

The Interpretation of the Term “Justice”
The majority of the Catholic clergy define justice as equality.69 This definition of justice as
equality is primarily directed towards the Croatian people and the Catholic Church, although they
argue that it embodies a general principle of justice. Such an understanding of justice is based
mostly on the assessment and evaluation of the political institutions and state structures in B&H
and the consequential “threat scenario” for the Croatian people and the Catholic Church. The
representatives of the Catholic clergy interviewed see the discrimination of the Croatian minority
in the domination of the Republika Srpska by Serbia and the Federation by M uslims.70 According
to the interviewees, the Croatian minority is discriminated against in the issues of restituting
property taken,71 employment opportunities,72 the possibility for war refugees to return,73 their own
curriculum and Catholic religious education for Croatian students 74 and the construction of
Catholic Churches.75 The Catholic representatives explain this discrimination against the Croatian
people primarily with the Dayton Accords and the state constitution created by the Accords.76 They
reject the current political structure in B&H and demand that the entities be done away with and
cantons introduced according to the Swiss model, in order to guarantee each region as much
autonomy as possible. This model implies that the representatives of the Catholic Church favor
dividing B&H into three autonomous regions, and thus an ethnic homogenization of the country.
“If living together after the war is not possible and we want to live in peace, we must separate
ourselves.”77 This discrim ination of the Croatian minority is amplified by the international
community, in the eyes of the clergy interviewed, because it discriminates against the Croatian
66
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people and the Catholic Church.78 In addition to this discrimination from the international
community, the Catholic representatives feel abandoned by their international allies. In this context,
several representatives of the Catholic clergy defend their understanding of the Catholic Church
as the guardian of the Croatian nation.79 This understanding of the function for the Catholic Church
divides the majority of the Catholic clergy in the post-war Bosnia, since the Dayton Accords and
political order of B&H guarantee neither the rights nor the freedom of the survivors among the
Croatian people.80 Cardinal Puljiæ in particular stresses that the fate of the Croatian people, and thus
the fate of the Catholic Church in B&H is at risk.81 M ost of the Catholic clergy do not mention the
topics of identifying, extraditing and punishing war criminals in connection with the term justice,
rather they show a conscious neutrality in relation to the term justice without ethnic or religious
justification. 82
2.3.3

The interpretation of the Term “Coexistence”
The Catholic clergy – just like the Bosnian Franciscans – generally support the coexistence
of nations and religions within B&H.83 Several of those interviewed gave voice to their deep
conviction of the beauty and appeal of coexistence, referring to the long tradition of multi-cultural
coexistence in B&H.84 The various ethnic groups and religious communities living together is only
thinkable for the majority of the Catholic majority if there are fundam ental political changes, as
they described in connection with their interpretation of the term justice. The Catholic clergy makes
their acceptance of a multiethnic and multi-religious Bosnia-Herzegovina dependent upon political
conditions that would guarantee the equality, and thus the basis for the existence of the Croatian
people in B&H. The understandings described indicate that most of the interviewees associate the
terms “respect,” and “recognition of the other” as neighbors with the term coexistence in relation
to their own ethnic or religious group and the political situation.85 In connection with this
interpretation, several interviewees m entioned the Bosnian saying: “Love your own, respect the
Other.”86 This allows a complex understanding of the Catholic clergy’s position on the question of
coexistence in B&H. Since the representatives of the Catholic Church see the existing political order
and the policies of the OHR and OSCE as a threat to Croatian identity, particularly in the area of
education, the saying above reflects the rejection of secular pluralism implemented by the
international community, which negates the cultural and religious differences in their view. They
simultaneously stress the necessity of recognizing cultural and religious differences through the
political system.87 One’s own ethnic group and religious community as a minority in the MuslimCroatian Federation is what is understood under “recognition of the Other” as neighbors, in
particular in Central Bosnia and the core region of Sarajevo. The Catholic clergy interviewed
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associated reconciliation with the term coexistence, yet during the course of the interview the
political conditions under which they could imagine this societal process taking place came into
play. The clergy connects reconciliation, as well as coexistence, of the ethnic groups and religious
communities in B&H with the restructuring of the political order to the advantage of their own
nation and religious community, such as might be achieved with a concordat of the Vatican with
the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.88 To strengthen and m aintain the religious and ethnic
identities under threat, the Catholic clergy sees itself forced to reject, or at least criticize, all
practices of coexistence that would aim for such an evening out of cultural and religious identities.
2.4 The Interpretations of the Serbian Orthodox Church of B&H
2.4.1
The Interpretation of the Term “Truth”
M any representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church associate the term truth with
“honesty”89 in contrast to “propaganda” against the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian
people perpetrated by the international community, the domestic and foreign press 90 and the
M uslims.91 This “propaganda” is related to the question of culpability for the war and the war
criminals, as well as the question of the role the Serbian Orthodox Church played in the Bosnian
war, according to the interviewees. The Bosnian media, state institution and the international
community are not non-partisan and free, rather they hold to a pro-Bosnian course. 92 For the
majority of those interviewed it is a fact that, also in reference to what happened in WW II such as
the Jasenovac concentration camp93 and the Kosovo myth,94 the Serbian people suffered the most
in the Bosnian war and had more martyrs in history than M uslims and Croatians.95
There is consensus among the Orthodox clergy about the question of culpability for the
war, that they reject the idea of Serbia having sole responsibility for the outbreak of the Bosnian
war. The majority of the clergy does not accept such a judgment of Serbia. Several clergy presented,
besides a general judgment that all warring factions and the international community were
responsible for this war,96 a more complex position on this question. Approxim ately half of the
clergy consider the Bosnian M uslims, the international community, Germany or the United States
are responsible for the war. 97 98 99
Several clergy put forth conspiracy theories about foreign powers that staged the Bosnian
war in order to then take over power in Bosnia or prevent accession to the EU.100 A number of the
Orthodox clergy consider the Serbian people to be the losers of the war and the Bosnian or Croatian
factions as the winners.101 The majority of the clergy interviewed addressed the topic of the
connection between the Serbian Orthodox Church and politics in general and its role in the Bosnian
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war with excuses. The Orthodox Church is an a-political institution,102 which tries not to interfere
in politics.103
L’église orthodoxe en général, ah, il y a des gens qui disent que l’église
orthodoxe a été pendant la guerre sur le coté du peuple serbe contre les
musulmans et les croates et qu’elle a participé à la guerre. Cela n’est pas la vérité,
cela n’est pas la vérité, c’est faux, l’église orthodoxe a cherché toujours le bien pour
tous les hommes, tous les hommes qui vivent en Bosnie maintenant. Elle n’est pas
du tout pour la guerre, le chauvinisme entre les serbes en Bosnie, parce qu il y
avait toujours beaucoup de choses entre les politiciens en Bosnie quand on parlait
de l’église orthodoxe, que l’on dit que l’église était contre les musulmans et les
croates. Nous sommes pour l’amour dans le monde, pour l’amour et l’amitié. [… ]
L’église orthodoxe était obligée de rester avec son peuple c’est l’église dans le
peuple, le peuple serbe, et elle était toujours avec nous, toujours avec nous, mais
pas pour la guerre, pas du tout pour la guerre, mais avec nous, il faut faire la
différence entre les serbes qui participent dans une guerre et l’église qui participe
à la vie d’un peuple. Je pense qu’il faut faire cette différence, l’église a toujours
participé à la vie du peuple et pendant la guerre également.104
As this quote shows, the Orthodox clergy object to the accusations that the Serbian
Orthodox Church actively caused the Bosnian war or at least supported it. The use of military
means is only legitimate in their eyes for a defensive war.105 Since most of the interviewees consider
the Bosnian war as an aggressive war,106 we can assume that many clergy see the military actions
of the Serbian army as legitimate defensive measures.
2.4.2

The Interpretation of the Term “Justice”
Just like the Catholic clergy and the representatives from the Jewish community, the
Orthodox clergy understand equality among all nations and religious communities living in the
territory of the Republic of Bosnia-H erzegovina as a part of the term justice.107 Just as in the
interpretation of the term truth, the understanding of justice is anchored in the self-image of the
Serbian people and the Serbian Orthodox Church as a target for anti-Serbian or pro-Bosnian politics
from the international community. This understanding of the term justice is based on the
assumption that their own people or their own religious community is being discriminated against.
The discrimination is seen as applicable as much for the Orthodox clergy from the international
community, especially from OHR and ICTY, but also from the M uslim-Croatian Federation.108
2.4.3

Definition of the Term “Coexistence”
The clergy from the Serbian Orthodox Church advocate co-existence of the national and
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religious communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.109 Nearly all of the clergy support cohabitation of
the national and religious communities in one territory,110 where the boundaries of the territory
guarantee the freedom of belief111 for all citizens. The practices of coexistence before the war are
seen by many clergy as an ideal, which cannot be realized again quickly with conditions as they are,
since sharing joys and sorrows means more than neighborly solidarity and the experiences in the
war, the loss of mutual trust, individual and collective fears and feelings of being threatened, as
well as the nationalistic propaganda campaigns described all work against it.112 Not least of all, the
fear of another war113 or due to discrimination suffered by the Serbs from the political system, the
Orthodox clergy see the necessity of maintaining the entities in B&H. Even though they feel that
the political order instituted by the Dayton Accords needs to be reformed, for example the cantons
of the federation or the executive filled with equal representation according to the constituting
people of B&H.114 Possible reform plans for these institutional regulations relating to police and
army thus meet with rejection.
2.5 Summary of the Evaluation
Considering the interpretations of the terms “truth”, “justice” and “coexistence”, there are
some agreements on content between the representatives interviewed from the Jewish and M uslim
religious communities and between the Catholic and Serbian Orthodox Churches: the term truth
is related by m ost of the representatives to the idea of culpability for the war. Catholics and
M uslims agree that the Bosnian war can be interpreted as Serbian aggression, whereby the Serbian
Orthodox clergy blame either Bosnian M uslims or the international community, in particular
Germany, for the early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.
The representatives of the Jewish and M uslim religious communities mention their
demand for clarity on the war crim es committed under the term truth, and demonstrate their
recognition of the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague (ICTY), although Serbian
Orthodox clergy use this topic to explain the apologetic position of the Serbian Orthodox Church
and to criticize the discriminating practices of the ICTY. M ost of the Catholic clergy do not mention
the topic of factual knowledge about war crimes committed, in contrast to the Bosnian Franciscans.
The majority of Islamic clergy interviewed understand justice as the punishm ent of the culprits
through global courts based on the rule of law. These interpretations are shared by half of the
Jewish community representatives and the representatives from the Bosnian Franciscans, whereby
the representatives of the Catholic and Serbian Orthodox Churches, as well as several from the
Jewish community, prefer to name the problem of equality or equal opportunities for ethnicities
and religious communities, especially in questions of restitution of property, religious education,
employment, etc.
Catholic and Orthodox clergy interpret the term justice similarly in that in adherence to the
Christian message of God’s love they address the necessity of forgiving guilt. M any Orthodox
clergy mention the demand for non-partiality in the sense of choosing not to make a judgment,
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which in this connection is taken from the Sermon on the M ount.
As a condition for successful coexistence, representatives of the Jewish and M uslim
religious communities and most of the Bosnian Franciscans support dismantling the entities to
create a unified state, as well as the principle of freedom of religion. Catholic and Orthodox clergy
on the other hand, have the sam e opinion that dismantling the entities with the goal of creating
autonomous regions or at least mostly autonomous cantons within the state territory. W hile
Catholic clergy consider such a reform to be an unavoidable necessity for successful coexistence
because of the M uslim-Bosnian majorities in the Croatian-M uslim Federation, Orthodox clergy
prefer to keep the status quo with the option of a unified central state. This difference in interests
between representatives from the religious traditions in B&H shows a historical continuity. Even
before the Bosnian war broke out the ruling coalition of the three nationalistic parties collapsed
under the question of whether B&H should remain a centralized state, as the M uslims wanted, or
be divided into cantons or federations of the republic based on the constitutional system, as the
Serbs and Croats preferred.115 Even at the time it became clear that only the SDA [the Party of
Democratic Action, a predominantly M uslim political party] was behind keeping B&H as a central
state, Serbia and Croatia supported a cantonization or federalization however, which would make
a later reunion of the respective settler regions with their “mother lands” of Croatia and Serbia
easier, and which would lead to the disintegration of B&H.116
Interpretation
of the main
terms

Jews

Catholics

Franciscans

Muslims

Serbian Orthodoxy

Truth

Honesty, trust,
clarification of
war crimes

Culpability
Aggression
Serbians

Clarification of war
crimes

Culpability
Aggression
Serbians

Punishment of
war criminals
equality + equal
opportunity

Equality + equal
opportunity
Forgiving guilt

Equality of all
constitutive peoples
of BiH
Forgiveness,
Punishment of war
criminals

Punishment of
war criminals

Culpability
Muslims,
International
community,
Germany
Neutrality
Critique of ICTY
Forgiving guilt
Equality + equal
opportunity

Dismantling
entities/central
state

Dismantling
entities/canton
model

Social justice
Reconciliation

Dismantling
entities/central
state

Justice

Coexistence

Acceptance of the
ICTY

Status quo
/Dismantling
entities/canton
mode

Table: Summary of interview results
The analysis results also show that the interreligious relations are stressed by the various
issues in conflict. These can be categorized as
a. Inter-ethnic objects of conflict within the discretionary power of politics–without directly
affecting religious communities. Among these are, for example, the question of culpability
for the war, the political order of B&H and the topic of war criminals, with the connected
issue of solidarity in the religious communities with nationalistic politicians and accused
war criminals.
b. Inter-ethnic objects of conflict within the discretionary power of politics–where the
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religious communities are affected. The question of equality of nations and religious
communities, the restitution of property, the legal status of religious groups, religious
education and political agreements of the state B&H with individual religious
communities such as the concordat of the government in B&H with the Vatican belong to
this group.
c. Inter-religious objects of conflict within the discretionary power of the religious
communities themselves, such as the authorization of building places of worship on land
in the possession of other religious communities.
As has been shown clearly here in the interview material quoted, the representatives of the
Catholic, Serbian-Orthodox and M uslim religious communities see themselves as the main victims
of the war, formed by ethno-clerical transfiguration and substitution of church members and
nation.117 Using the destruction of houses of worship and cemeteries, the official representatives
of the religious institutions portray their own religious group as the main victim s of the war.
Responsible parties from their own ranks are either not discussed or the question of culpability for
one’s own group is completely ignored.118 “A readiness for critical examinations of one’s own
history and the crimes that occurred does not exist. The question of culpability, if asked at all, is
either individualized or generalized. This is especially true for the religious communities despite
the religious wisdom regarding guilt and forgiveness.” 119
W here clergy have taken over the function of “proxy politicians” far away from the
political power of jurisdiction of the international community, and presented themselves as
guardians of the nation, the chances for a self-critical distancing from the nationalistic ideas, for
political alliances, and the initiation of a reconciliation process from the ranks of religions so full
of knowledge about guile and forgiveness are imaginably poor. The only path that remains to work
through the objects of conflict as a chance at a reconciliation process is from the ranks of the clergy.
The dialogue organizations already in existence in Bosnia, such as the Interreligious Council of
B&H as an initiative of the W orld Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP), ABRAHAM , Oci and
Oci or IM IC, as initiatives from Bosnian Franciscan monks, could build the basis for conflict
resolution tasks if their local and supra-regional programs are mutually networked and
supplemented by “conflict solving workshops,” that address the virulent conflict issues in the
individual communities. Since the official High Representative of the International Community,
Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling has years of concrete experience in mediation within B&H, we may
hope that such projects will be receive the financial and logistical support from the respective
institutions of the OHR and the OSCE.
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